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An Empirical Investigation of Poison Pill Use in the Banking Industry

Abstract
This study examines the use of poison pill plans in the banking industry. This research
demonstrates that the increasing number of banks adopting a poison pill plan is related to
increasing market concentration. There are two hypotheses explaining the intent of these
adoptions: (l) Managerial Entrenchment and (2) Shareholder Interest. This study specifically
examined these hypotheses in the banking industry between 1986 and 2003. Results indicated
that comparison banks not adopting a poison pill had a significant improvement in ROE the year
after their peers adopted a poison pill. Additional results of this research contradict the popularly
held belief that a poison pill plan provides a significant improvement in the probability of
survival.
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I.

Introduction
The 1980s was an era of expansive mergers and acquisitions fueled by the popularity of

corporate raids. Although this drastically changed the landscape of many industries, the banking
industry was relatively untouched. Commercial banks were protected from hostile takeovers by
federal regulations. The McFadden Act of 1927 and the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956
supported the existence of 24,495 small banks l in 1985. However, by 2003 there were 11,021
small banks and 80 banks had adopted a poison pill plans (Critchfield, Davis, Davison, Gratton,
Hanc, Samolyk, 2004). The Riegle Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of
1994 was the catalyst of the rapid consolidation. Prior to this act, a commercial bank could only
make acquisitions across state lines if state the bank was operating in and the state of the target
allowed interstate banking. Riegle Neal removed state and federal restrictions on bank mergers
creating rapid consolidation in the industry.
During this period of deregulation, a growing number of banks adopted poison pill plans.
A poison pill plan is a defensive measure adopted by a management team to protect a company
from an unwanted takeover. Functionally, this measure releases additional shares of stock, at a
discount, to shareholders of record when an unwanted acquirer achieves pre-specified stake in
the company. This version of a poison pill plan is known as "flip-in rights." Stockholders are
allowed to flip-in their "shareholder's rights,,3 in return for additional shares ofthe company
(Fleischer and Sussman, 2000). Although, there are other varieties of poison pills, the flip-in
right was predominantly used by the banking industry between 1987 and 2004.

Smaller banks are those classified as having assets under $1 billion.
Most plans dictate that the acquirer is acting without board approval and has acquired between 15 and 20% of the
companies outstanding shares.
3 Poison Pill Plans are often referred to as shareholder's/stockholder's rights plan by the management team. This
terminology displays the plans in the shareholder's interests.
1
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In a corporation's poison pill announcement, mangers cite the adoption of the pill as a
means to protect the rights of the shareholder. However the market reaction to the
announcement of a poison pill is usually negative (Bojanic and Officer, 1994). Because a poison
pill plan is adopted without shareholder approval, it strips power from the owners of the
company. The loss of power decreases shareholders faith in management and is reflected by a
decreasing stock price4 • This response is further attributed to the managerial entrenchment
hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, a management team adopted the poison pill out of
self-interest (Malatesta and Walking, 1988 and Ryngaert, 1988). Contrary to this hypothesis,
positive post-announcement stock returns are attributed to the use of a poison pill as a bargaining
strategy (Comment and Schwert, 1995 and Heron and Lie, 2000). Long-term analysis in
operating performance also proved poison pill adoptions have positive impacts (Danielson and
Karpoff, 2006). These hypothesis and results demonstrate the effect of a poison pill varies based
on the intent ofthe management and length of the study.
The commercial banks are unique because federal regulation minimizes the number of
takeovers. The three prior hypotheses do not apply as neatly to banks because the intent behind a
poison pill adoption is different. First, banking takeovers or mergers are characterized as being
"friendly." Because ofthis, a poison pill used to entrench a management team is unnecessary.
Secondly, hostile takeovers of commercial banks usually fail because ofthe stringent and lengthy
approval process (Brewer III, Jackson III, and Wall, 2006). The time necessary for regulatory
approval functions as a defensive measure.

Finally, the absence of a poison pill plan in this

industry has resulted in increased takeover premiums and management benefits (Brewer III,
Jackson III, and Wall, 2006). Acquirers do not have to fear the implementation of costly

Unless previously written into a corporation's bylaws, a management team can adopt a poison pill plan and most
other defensive measures without a shareholder vote.
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defensive measures and reward the target company accordingly. Despite these differences in the
banking industry, more than 70 commercial banks adopted a poison pill plan between 1986 and
2003.
II.

Literature review
A. Regulatory Changes
The United States banking industry has a long history of small and geographically

diverse banks. In 1985 there were 14,349 banks with total assets of less than $1 billion,
however, after the liberalization of interstate banking laws there were 7,337 banks in 1995
(Critchfield, Davis, Davison, Gratton, Hanc and Samolyk, 2004). The drastic decline in the
number of commercial banks is attributed to two factors. First, technological improvements
made distant acquisitions easier (DeYoung and Whalen, 1994). Fax machines, Internet
connections, and cell phones, provided faster connections between bank branches. The Internet
has created a paper-free medium of near instant responses, which has decreased the paper work
and regulatory filing times.
The second trend resulting in the increase in merger activity was the relaxation of
geographic branching restrictions (DeYoung and Whalen, 1994). In 1994 the Riegle Neal Act
allowed for nation-wide consolidation of the banking industry. Prior to its passage, bank holding
companies were only allowed to cross state lines if the state they were headquartered in and the
state of their perspective target had legalized interstate banking. The Riegle Neal Act overrode
the state acts and made interstate banking legal in almost every states.
The Riegle Neal Act not only deregulated interstate banking, but served as a catalyst for
industry wide consolidations. Akhigbe, Madura, and Whyte (2004) examined a sample of254
bank acquisitions between 1987 and 2001 and found that the Riegle Neal Act significantly
5

Thus far _ banks have accepted the Riegle Neal Act of 1994.
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increased the probability of a bank takeover. In relation to this increased probability, there was a
resurgence of poison pill adoptions. Community banks that had been common businesses in
small towns for 50 years needed a way to protect their identity from a larger acquirer. The
answer to this problem was the adoption of a poison pill plan.
The literature provides many examples of why the banking industry has consolidated in
the last two decades, but there is little evidence of the effect of the decreased number ofbanks.
The regulatory changes resulted in an increased probability oftakeover but this has not been
correlated with a greater number of poison pill adoptions.

Because the banking merger activity

is fairly recent there is little data on the affect of a poison pill adoption. Specifically, a
commercial bank may experience a positive or negative impact to firm value and operating
performance after the adoption.

B. Poison Pill Defensive Measures
According to Malatesta and Walking (1988) and Ryngaert's (1988) hypothesis, a banks
management team adopts a poison pill out of self-interest. The cost of this maneuver is
measured by a decrease in share price. After the announcement, stockholders lose faith in the
management team's abilities or are upset about the poison pill adoption not being raised raise for
a vote. Bojanic and Officer (1994) discovered that the shareholder reactions decrease the stock
return by -0.475% two days after the plan is announced. However, there are many variables that
surround the adoptions of a poison pill plan. Unless the adoption is the response to an immediate
takeover bid, the effects are not fully measured in a two-day period. Opposite this scenario, if a
poison pill was adopted as a routine measure, then the two-day effect is representative of the

6

shareholders reactions. A two-day period is too short to analyze the banking industry, as its
adoptions are predominantly classified as "routine measures,,6.
Additional research on the banking industry supports the Comment and Schwert (1995)
and Heron and Lie's (2000) value hypotheses. Brewer III, Jackson III, and Wall's (2006) found
that bank management uses defensive measures as bargaining tools. However, the bargains
raised the takeover premium but also benefited the managerial team by securing a large
severance package or a position in the acquiring company. Additionally, this industry is
historically characterized for its friendly takeovers, and the deals are friendliest when the bank
management has an assured interest in the deal (Brewer III, Jackson III, and Wall, 2006). The
stockholders benefit when this interest is based on stock ownership.
A positive affect of adopting a poison pill plan is an increase in takeover premium.
Strategically, this creates firm stability allowing for long-term research and development (Pearce
II and Robinson Jr., 2004). The Riegle Neal Act has increased the probability of a bank
takeover, but the results on the number of anti-takeover strategies adopted have not been
measured. Using the Akhigbe et al (2004) results as a basis, the logical result of an increased
probability of a bank takeover is an increased number of poison pill adoptions.
Additional evidence supports Comment and Schwert (1995) and Heron and Lie's (2000)
increased value hypothesis. The traditionally "friendly" terms? mergers and acquisitions in the
banking industry are conducted under reduces cases of managerial entrenchment. However,
friendly deals use a poison pill as leverage in negotiating the takeover premium and details
(Heron and Lie, 2000). If a poison pill is adopted to increase firm value, an increase in Return

Based on the announcements from the LexislNexis database. Many banks rationalize their adoption of a poison
pill plan as a routine measure necessary to protect the shareholders from an unfair or unwanted takeover.
7 Friendly takeovers are defined as the Target making an offer to the shareholders that the board of directors has
approved.
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on Equity (ROE) will be noted. Additionally, poison pill adoptions have proven to positively
increase operating perfonnance as measured by Return on Assets (ROA) (Danielson and
Karpoff, 2006).
However, economy wide studies found that a poison pill adoption can have a negative
affect on value and perfonnance (Srinidhi and Sen, 2002). A poison pill enables a company to
engage in long-tenn research and development, which decreases ROE and ROA. Under these
conditions, the poison pill adoption yields positive results in the long-tenn. In comparison with
Malatesta and Walking (1988) and Ryngaert (1988), who noted negative market reactions, these
studies noted positive financial results over a longer period.
C. The Banking Industry

Current banking literature explains the acquisition trend, but does not explain the effect
of a poison pill adoption. In the post Riegle-Neal period, banks are engaging in acquisitions to
diversify into new geographic areas and product markets based on the "earnings diversification"
hypothesis (Brewer III, Jackson III, and Jagtiani, 2000). The intent is to create banks that are
''too-big-to-fail'' and can exploit the remaining regulations by sheer size. As a result of the
"grow or die philosophy," large commercial banks are actively acquiring community banks. In
response, many community banks are making friendly takeover attempts to increase their size.
However, the bulk of these mergers fail due to the lack of financial resources and stringent
regulations (Kline, 1997).
In the years since the Riegle Neal Act of 1997, the number of community banks has
drastically declined. Prior literature has demonstrated that the disappearance ofthe small
community banks is related to the changing regulatory state (Akhigbe, Madura, and Whyte,
2004). From this, it is hypothesized that the market consolidation will positively relate to the
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number of poison pill adoptions. Second, an adoption will result in increased bank valuation and
operating performance, consistent with Comment and Schwert's (1995) and Heron and Lie's
(2000) hypothesis. Finally, the adoption of a poison pill will result in an increased probability of
that a bank will not be acquired one year after adoption8.

III.

Data

Data for this study consists of the population of commercial banks adopting poison pill
plans between 1986 and 2004. The original population contained 75 commercial banks. Five
banks were eliminated from the final sample due to a lack of data the sample size was restricted
to 70. This sample was gathered from the LexisNexis database using the search terms
"commercial bank" and "poison pill plan announced" or "shareholders rights plan." A
comparison sample of 70 banks that did not adopt poison pill plans between 1986 and 2004 was
also gathered. The comparison banks were matched based on their poison pill peer's year of
plan adoption and total assets.
The sample banks were limited to publicly traded, commercial banks, without foreign
offices. This resulted in a sample size of70 banks. After each bank's poison pill announcement
was found, the Federal Depositors Insurance Corporation (FDIC) website was searched to verify
their certification number and prior history of mergers and acquisitions. Additionally, none of
the banks were subject to failures the year after the poison pill adoption.
With the sample of poison pill banks and peer banks the Chicago Federal Reserve
database was used to provide Net Income (NI), Total Assets (TA) and Capital Equity (CE) data
From this information, ROE was calculated with the formula CE divided by NI. Using NI
divided by TA, the ROA for each bank was calculated. Additionally, each bank's market share

g This is measured as the probability that a poison pill plan will help a bank survive the year following the adoption
as compared to a bank that does not have defensive measures.
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percentage was calculated using the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) fonnula. The HHI
fonnula is presented below.
n

H=~s/
j=l

Where
Sj

= the market share of finn I in the market

n = the number of finns in the industry
H

= liN to one, with N = the number of finns in the market

The two control variables used were Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate and the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The GDP data was acquired from the St. Louis Federal
Reserve website for the years 1986 through 2004. From the yearly data the growth rate was
calculated using an Excel spreadsheet. The HHI data was calculated using the yearly data
provided by the Chicago Federal Reserve website. Similar to the market share calculations, HHI
used an Excel spreadsheet and the HHI fonnula to calculate the banking industry concentration.

IV.

Methodology
To analyze why the commercial banks began adopting poison pills in the mid-1990s a

Pearson's Correlation was run on HHI and the number of poison pills adopted in each year. A
second Pearson's Correlation was measured the effects ofGDP on the yearly number of
adoptions.
A Non-Parametric Wilcoxon Sign Ranks Test was run to measure the before and after

affect of a poison pill adoption on ROE and ROA. The test was also run on the comparison
sample and combined samples.
The Wilcoxon Sign Ranks test compares matched observations providing insight about
differences between the two populations. A positive result indicates that the post-adoption ROE
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or ROA was higher. A negative result indicates that the pre-adoption ROE or ROA was higher.
However, significance is required to detennine that there is a difference in the before and after
data.
A logistic regression measured the probability that a poison pill adopting bank would
have a greater probability of survival one year post-adoption. The surviving groups were
designated from the acquired groups by the dummy variable ID2. This variable designated the
survivors with a "1" and the acquired banks with a "2." The ID2 dummy served as the
dependent variable in the logistic regression. A second dummy variable, ID, was used as an
independent variable measuring the probability that the poison pill banks had a greater chance of
survival. The ID dummy designated poison pill banks with a "0" and comparison banks with a
"I." Remaining independent variables included ROE and ROA. Control variables included
GDP andHHI.
The logistic regression measures the probability that the dependent variable is equal to 1.
Using the interpretation of E(y) as a probability in logistic regression formula:
E(y)

=

P(y = 1 IXI,

X2, ••.

,xp )

The probability of the poison pill adopting bank having a greater ROE, ROA, or chance of
survival was measured. The value of E(y) ranges from 0 to 1, with E(y) gradually approaching 1
as the value of X becomes larger, where X serves as the independent variable. Conversely, the
value of E(y) approaches 0 as the value of X becomes smaller. The fact that E(y) ranges from 0
to 1, with the resulting curve forming the equation, describes the probability that the dependent
variable equals 1 (Anderson, Sweeney, and Williams, 2005).
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v.

Results

A. Results ofthe Correlation Analysis Using GDP
The result of the correlation analysis on GDP and number of adoptions is provided in
Figure 1. In this graph, the year of the poison pill adoption is listed on the X-axis and the
number of plans adopted is listed on the left side Y-axis. The trend line presents the year over
year change in GDP as measured by the numbers on the right Y-axis.
Insert Figure 1 here
The results of the correlation proved a negative relationship between GDP growth rate
and the number of poison pills adopted in a year existed. A Pearson Correlation indicated at ten
percent and five percent significance that GDP and Year have a correlation of-0.253. This
inverse relation demonstrates that as the GDP growth rate increases, the number of poison pills
adopted decreases. Opposite this, as GDP growth rate decreases the number of poison pills
increases. Table 1 provides the full correlation matrix including the exact significance levels.
Insert Table 1 here
The nature of these results is do not imply increases in GDP growth rate cause decreased
poison pill adoptions, but there is a relationship between changes in GDP and the number of
adoptions. If poison pills increase firm value, then an adoption during an economic downturn
would boost a bank's financial value. However, it has yet to be proven that the adoption of a
poison pill plan positively impacts firm value or operating performance in a bank.

B. Results for the Correlation Analysis Using HHI
The second correlation is graphically presented in Figure 2. The layout of the graph has
the year of the poison pill adoption on the X-axis and the number of adoptions on the Y-axis.
However, the trend line provides the data for the HHI, which measures the industry
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concentration, taking values between 0 and 1. A HHI of "0" indicates a completely free market
while "I" indicates a monopolistic market. These values are reported on the right Y-axis of the
Figure 2.
Insert Figure 2 here
Figure 2 graphically shows the increasing market concentration as the HHI trend line
rises over the years. The Pearson Correlation revealed a positive coefficient of 0.451 at
significance levels of ten, five, and one percent. This relationship demonstrated that as the
market became more concentrated, the number of poison pills adopted increases. Table 2
provides the results of the Pearson Correlation.
Insert Table 2 here
These results demonstrated that banks adopt poison pills in relation to increasing market
concentration. Because the purpose of the pill is to protect a firm from unwanted acquisition,
these results are in line with past research (Malatesta and Walking, 1988, Ryngaert, 1988). This
correlation explains why the poison pills resurgence in the banking industry during the mid
1990s. The Riegle Neal Act of 1997 allowed for a steep increase in market concentration, which
related to an increasing number of poison pill adoptions. The national association banks wanted
to expand their market presence and acquired more banks. In response, the traditionally small
and independent banks sought to maintain their identity through the adoption of a poison pill.

e.

Results for the Non-Parametric Comparison

The results for the before and after effects of poison pill adoption on ROE and ROA were
measured with the Wilcoxon Sign Ranks test, presented in Table 4. This non-parametric test was
run in three, groups presented in three different panels. Panel A provides the ROE and ROA
results for the poison pill group of banks. Panel B presents the results for ROE and ROA of
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comparison group. The PostROE and ROE variables were analyzed first. In all three panels
Post ROE represents the ROE the year before the adoption. ROE then measures the ROE the
year after the adoption. Similarly, PostROA represents the ROA one year prior to the adoption.
ROA represents the ROA one year after the adoption. The results provided in Panel C are for the
cross sample comparison representing the overall industry.
Insert Table 3 here
The results for the non-parametric test on the poison pill group are negative on ROE and
ROA. The implications are that the ROE and ROA was higher after the poison pill adoption.
These results would be consistent with the increase in operating performance and firm valuation
hypothesis but they are non-significant at p-values often percent (Comment and Schwert, 1995,
Heron and Lie, 2000).
The comparison sample also provided a negative effect on ROE and ROA for the three
years surrounding the adoption. However, the results on the before and after ROE measure were
statistically significant. At p-values of ten and five percent, the ROE was higher for the
comparison banks in the year after their poison pill peers adoption. This result was unexpected
and is possibly explained by the managerial entrenchment hypothesis (Malatesta and Walking,
1988, Ryngaert, 1988). Because these banks did not adopt a poison pill, the shareholders did not
show a significant negative reaction in the form of decreased ROE.

D. Increased Probability ofSurvival
Of the 140 banks in the sample 10% were acquired the year after the adoption of a poison
9

pill plan

•

Additional data detailing the acquiring companies' names is provided in Table 6 of

This figure is derived from the entire sample including both Poison Pill adopting banks and their comparison/peer
bank. The total sample size was thus 140 banks, 70 that adopted a poison pill plan and 70 matched peer banks. The
10% figure was based on 14 banks out of the total 140 that were acquired the year after the adoption of the
provisions.

9
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the appendix. The dummy variable ID served as the primary independent variable. In the
logistic regression it measured the probability that a poison pill bank was more likely to survive
than non-poison pill bank. However, the results proved to be non-significant. This meant that
poison pill banks did not have a different probability of survival than their non-adopting peers.
The GDP and HHI control variables were also non-significant.
The results of the logistic regression are provided in two panels of Table 3. Panel A
provides the results for the logistic regression that used ROA and ID as its independent variables.
Panel B provides the results for the logistic regression that used ROE and ID as its independent
variables. The complete results of both regressions are presented below.
Insert Table 4 here
The non-significant results were noted when using either ROA or ROE as an independent
variable. The first logistic regression, using ROA and ID as the independent variables, provided
a positive B value, but was non-significant. The second regression using ROA and ID again
provided positive B values, but also lacked significance. However, this configuration provided
the highest B value for the ID variable. These results were contrary to my hypothesis that a
poison pill bank would have a greater chance of survival as compared with a bank that did not
adopt a poison pill plan.

Conclusion
The 1997 implementation of the Riegle Neal act opened the banking industry to cross
border mergers and acquisitions. During the same time period, the number of poison pill plans
adopted by banks experienced a second increase. The objective of this study was to examine the
effect of the regulatory changes on the use of poison pills and to discover the cause of the
resurgence in popularity of the plan. Based on data from other industries it was known that a
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poison pill can have varying effects, depending on the variables measured and time frame used.
Finally, the purpose of a poison pill adoption, as stated in numerous corporate announcements,
was to protect the shareholders against an unfair takeover offer. Therefore the adoption of a
poison pill should have increased a bank's probability of survival.
The correlation analysis strongly related the post Riegle Neal market concentration to an
increasing number of poison pill adoptions. These results were significant at all p-values and
provide some rationale for the mid-1990s surge in the popularity of the poison pill. The
relationship with GDP growth rate was inverse and not as strong. This meant that adoption was
probably not due to economic factors. The strongest explanation is offered by the increasing
market concentration as measured by HHI. In response to an increasing number of takeovers,
smaller banks needed to adopt defensive measures, a poison pill, to protect their independence.
In contrast to the previous research of Comment and Schwert (1995) and Heron and Lie
(2000), a significant improvement in finn value or operating perfonnance after the poison pill
adoption was not noted. In addition, a significant result was noticed in the before and after
comparison of ROE for the comparison bank sample. This result was unexpected, as the poison
pill was hypothesized to improve ROE in the adopting banks (Danielson and Karpoff, 2006).
The results for the logistic regression on survival probability also proved to be contrary to
the original hypothesis. These results came closest to significance when using ROE as the
independent variable. One explanation for the lack of significance is the relatively short post
adoption time period examined. Looking at one year post-adoption is not long-tenn enough to
measure survivability for banks that adopt poison pills as routine measures. The one-year time
frame only accounts for mergers that were started during the adoption year and therefore rules
out future acquisitions.

16

Additionally, the three-year time frame limited the poison pills effect on ROE and ROA.
Danielson and Karpoff (2006) and Srinidhi and Sen (2002) noted their significant results using
time periods of three to five years post-adoption. Because this sample data extended into 2004, it
was impossible to get the data for five years after the adoption. Increasing the time frame would
also increase the probability that a bank is subject to a hostile offer.
The non-parametric test results may have been insignificant because the variables used
were not entirely representative ofthe banking industry. These variables, ROE and ROA, were
drawn from past poison pill studies that examined the all economic sectors. However, the
banking industry is different than most sectors because they do not conduct research and
development, are greatly affected by inflation, and answer to more investors. A future direction
of this study is to examine the poison pills effect on the number of deposits and loans issued in
the years after the announcement.
Altogether, this study offers explanations for the resurgence of the poison pill in the mid
1990s. However, it was unable to significantly prove that a poison pill adoption positively
affected firm valuation and operating performance as noted by Comment and Schwert (1995),
Heron and Lie (2000), and Danielson and Karpoff (2006). Also, logistic regression results did
not support the hypothesis that the adoption of a poison pill plan increases the probability that a
bank will have a greater probability of survival one year post adoption.
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Appendix
A. Statistical Analysis
Table 1 provides the correlation analysis of Year and GDP. The year variable represents the total number of poison
pill adoptions for a particular year. The GDP variable is the United State year over year change in Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) as measured by the St. Louis Federal Reserve Board. The Pearson's Correlation provides a -0.253
relation at 10% and 5% significance. This indicates that as GDP increases the number of poison pill adoptions
decreases. The inverse relationship also means that as the number of poison pill adoptions increase, the GDP is
likely to decrease. These results are graphically presented in Figure 1.

Table 1
Correlation Analysis of Year and GDP
Year
GDP
Year
Pearson Correlation
1.000 -0.253
0.034
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
70
70
GDP
-0.253
Pearson Correlation
1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)
0.034
70
N
70
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Table 2 presents the results of a correlation analysis on Year and HHI. The year variable represents the number of
poison pill plans adopted by commercial banks in a specific year. The HHI variable is the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index, which measures the level of market concentration. A HHI of I represents a monopolistic market while a HHI
of 0 represents a very open market. Results of the Pearson's Correlation demonstrate a 0.45 Irelationship between
Year and HHI. As the market consolidates, as measured by the HHI, the number of poison pill plans adopted
increases. This result supports the hypothesis that poison pill plans are adopted in response to market
consolidations. Banks adopted these defensive measures in responses to the Riegle Neal regulatory changes that
increased the probability of a takeover as demonstrated by Akhigbe, Madura, and Whyte (2004). Graphical
representation of this analysis is provided in Figure 2.

Table 2
Correlation Analysis of Year and HHI
Year
HHI
Year
Pearson Correlation
1.000
0.451
Sig. (2-tailed)
0.000
N
70
70
HHI
Pearson Correlation
0.451
1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)
0.000
N
70
70
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Table 3 provides the results of the Non-Parametric Test that measured the before and after changes resulting from a
poison pill adoption. Panel A provides the results for the poison pill banks measuring fIrst Return on Equity (ROE).
The change in ROE is negative following a poison pill adoption, but this difference is non-signifIcant. Similarly, the
Return on Assets (ROA) variable is negative, but the results are non-signifIcant. Panel B provides the before and
after comparison data for the peer banks that did not adopt a poison pill plan. The ROE variable is negative, and
statistically signifIcant. This implies that the comparison group had a higher ROE the year after the poison pills
were adopted. The ROA variable is also negative, but is non-signifIcant. Overall, the adoption of a poison pill plan
does not directly increase ROE or ROA in the one year follow up.

Table 3
Changes in operating performance before and after poison pill adoption
Statistical data
Mean Median Z Score Asymp. Sig. (2-tai1ed)
Panel A: Changes in performance measured in the poison pill group
PostROE-ROE
-1.428 0.153
PostROA-ROA
-1.441 0.150
Panel B: Changes in performance measured in the peer group
PostROE-ROE
-2.000 0.045
PostROA-ROA
-1.253 0.210
Panel C: ROE & ROA as measured in both samples
ROE ID 0
0.1396 0.1210 -0.467 0.641
0.0999 0.1329
ROE ID 1
0.0129 0.0098 -0.604 0.546
ROA ID 0
0.1084 0.1227
ROA ID 1
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Table 4 presents the results of the logistic regression. This test measured the probability that the adoption of a
poison pill plan improved the chances of survival. The independent variable ill2, represented surviving banks with
a "I" and acquired banks with a "0." The control variables included Gross Domestic Product (GOP) and
Herfmdahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The dummy variable ill differentiated poison pill banks with a "0" from the
comparison banks, "I." Two Logistic Regressions were run. The fIrst used the independent variables ROA and ill.
The second used ROE and ill. Panel A provides the results for the effect on ROA and notes a positive B value for
both ROA and ill. This denotes that surviving banks have stronger Returns on Assets and benefIt from adopting
poison pill plans, however, these results are non-signifIcant. The second regression, presented in Panel B examined
the impact of Return on Equity and ill. The B value was positive indicating an increase in ROE for surviving banks
and increased probability of survival, but the results were non-signifIcant. The conclusion is that poison pill
adoptions do not signifIcantly increase a bank's probability of survival one year after adoption.

Table 4
Logistic Regression Analysis
Equation Variables

B
Panel A: Effect on ROA
GDP
0.158
HHI
-7.19
ROA
18.916
ID
0.614
Constant 1.322
Panel B: Effect on ROE
GDP
0.165
HHI
-7.788
ROE
0.584
ID
1.286
Constant 1.389

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

0.242
22.463
25.817
0.589
0.891

0.429
0.102
0.537
1.089
2.202

1
1
1
1
1

0.513
0.749
0.464
0.297
0.138

1.171
0.001
2.00E+08
1.849
3.752

0.245
22.264
0.594
0.904
0.892

0.456
0.122
0.965
2.021
2.427

1
1
1
1
I

0.500
0.726
0.326
0.155
0.119

1.180
0.000
1.793
3.617
4.012
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B. Descriptive Statistics
Table 5 provides the name of each of the banks in the study that adopted a poison pill provision between 1986 and
2004. This table provides information detailing the purpose behind the adoption: Friendly Deal, Routine Measure,
Unsolicited Proposal, Sudden Stake Accumulation, and Hostile Tender Offer. In total, 93% of the population cited
"routine measures" as their rationale for adoption. Of the other four justifications, only the sudden stake
accumulation was used by more than one bank. The hostile tender offer description, which is most commonly
associated with a poison pill adoption, was used by one bank. The furthest column to the right details the status of
the board of directors on the date of the adoption. The combination of a staggered board and poison pill is the
strongest defensive measure a company can take. Unfortunately, the staggered board information for the
comparison sample was not found and therefore not analyzed in this study.

Table 5
Poison Pill Bank Descriptions

1st Constitution Bancorp
Andover Bancorp Inc
Arrow Financial Corp
BNCcorp
BSB Bancorp Inc
BT Financial Corp
BancorpSouth Inc
Barnett Banks Inc
Bryn Mawr Bank Corp
CB Bancshares Inc
California Bancshares Inc
California Independent
Bancorp
Capital Corp of the West
Central Co-Operative Bank
Citizens Banking Corp
City Holding Co
Civic Bancorp
Commerce Bancshares Inc
Commonwealth Bancshares
Corp
Community Banks Inc
Community Finanetal Group
Inc
Community First Bankshares
Inc
First Interstate of Iowa Inc
First Union Corp
First Virginia Banks Inc
Firstar Corp
Fulton Financial Corp

Date of
Adoption
3/18/2004
2/16/1989
5/13/1997
5/30/2001
5/22/1989
3/27/1991
3/28/2001
2/21/1990
11/18/2003
3/16/1989
6/30/1995
11/21/2002
9/26/1997
10/24/1991
7/20/1990
4/10/1991
11/11/1996
8/23/1988
7/11/1990
2/12/2002
1/21/1998

Plan Description
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Friendly Deal

Staggered Board
State
No
New Jersey
Massachusetts
No
No
New York
North Dakota
Yes
No
New York
Pennsylvania
No
Yes
Mississippi
No
Florida
No
Pennsylvania
No
Hawaii
No
California

Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure

California
California
Massachusetts
Michigan
West Virginia
California
Missouri

No
No
No
No
No
No
No

Routine Measure
Routine Measure

Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania

No
Yes

Routine Measure

Tennessee

No

Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure

North Dakota
Iowa
North Carolina
Virginia
Wisconsin
Pennsylvania

No
No
No
No
No
No

1/5/1995
12/11/1991
12/18/1990
7/27/1988
1/19/1989
6/21/1989
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Glen Burnie Bancorp
Hancock Holding Co
Independent Bank Corp
LNB Bancorp,Inc
LSB Bancshares Inc
Lakeland Bancorp Inc
Lenox Bancorp Inc
Lincoln Financial Corp
MNB Bancshares Inc
MassBank Corp
Mercantile Bancorp
NBT Bancorp Inc
NSD Bancorp Inc
National Community Banks
Inc
National Penn Bancshares Inc
North Fork Bancorp Inc
North Side Savings Bank
Northern Trust Corp
Old Second Bancorp Inc
Pacific Bank NA
Pacific Capital Bancorp
Patriot National Bank
Peoples Bancorp of Worcester
Inc
Provident Bankshares Corp
Quincy Savings Bank
Second National Financial
Corp
Sierra Tahoe Bancorp
Silicon Valley Bancshares
SouthTrust Corp
Southside Bancshares Corp
Suffolk Bancorp
Surety Capital Corp
Tolland Bank
Trustcompany Bancorp
US Bancorp
USTCorp
Union Planters Corp
United National Bancorp
Village Bancorp Inc
Waltham Corp

2/17/1998
2/21/1997
1/24/1991
10/24/2000
2/11/1998
8/24/2001
6/13/1999
12/19/1989
3/30/2001
1/16/1990
5/23/1988
11/16/1994
9/13/2002
12/19/1990
8/23/1989
2/28/1989
4/18/1996
10/17/1989
9/17/2002
11/6/1996
12/15/1999
4/15/2004
3/28/1989
1/18/1995
9/28/1992
9/14/1998
12/27/1995
10/27/1998
2/22/1989
5/27/1993
10/23/1995
6/19/1997
6/20/1989
3/29/1990
11/10/1989
10/13/1995
1/19/1989
11/1/2001
9/23/1996
1/23/1989

Maryland
Mississippi
Massachusetts
Ohio
North Carolina
New Jersey
Ohio
Indiana
Kansas
Massachusetts
Missouri
New York
Pennsylvania

No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes

New Jersey
Pennsylvania
New York

No
No
No

New York
lllinois
lllinois
California
California
Connecticut

No
No
Yes
No
No
No

Massachusetts
Maryland
Massachusetts

No
No
No

Routine Measure Virginia
Routine Measure California
Routine Measure California
Routine Measure Alabama
Routine Measure Missouri
Hostile Tender Offer New York
Routine Measure Texas
Routine Measure Connecticut
Routine Measure New Jersey
Routine Measure Oregon
Routine Measure Massachusetts
Routine Measure . Tennessee
Routine Measure New Jersey
Routine Measure lllinois
Routine Measure Virginia

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No

Unsolicited Proposal
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Sudden Stake
Accumulation
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Sudden Stake
Accumulation
Routine Measure
Routine Measure
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Washington Trust Bancorp Inc
Wintrust Financial Corp
Zions Bancorp

8/16/1996
7/31/1998
9/27/1996

Routine Measure
Routine Measure
Routine Measure

Rhode Island
Illinois
Utah

No
No
No
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Table 6 provides the descriptive statistics for the fate of both bank samples one year after the poison adoption. Out
of the original population of70 banks that had adopted poison pills, five were acquired one year later. From the
comparison sample, 9 banks were acquired in the same one year period. In spite of the larger number of non-poison
pill banks being acquired, a logistic regression did not reveal a significant decrease in the probability of takeover
associated with a poison pill adoption.

Table 6
Bank Descriptions
Poison Pill Bank
1st Constitution Bancorp
Andover Bancorp Inc
Arrow Financial Corp
BNCcorp
BSB Bancorp Inc
BT Financial Corp
BancorpSouth Inc
Barnett Banks Inc
Bryn Mawr Bank Corp
CB Bancshares Inc
California Bancshares Inc
California Independent
Bancorp
Capital Corp of the West
Central Co-Operative Bank
Citizens Banking Corp
City Holding Co.
Civic Bancorp
Commerce Bancshares Inc
Commonwealth Bancshares
Corp
Community Banks Inc
Community Financial Group
Inc
Community First Bankshares
Inc
First Interstate of Iowa Inc
First Union Corp
First Virginia Banks Inc
Firstar Corp
Fulton Financial Corp
Glen Burnie Bancorp

Acquirer

Comparison Bank
Walpole Co-Operative Bank
Fanners First Bank
Bank One Trust Co. NA
BNC National Bank Union Center National Bank
Liberty Bank for Savings
First Amarillo Bancorporation, Inc.
National City Bank
Continental Bank Corp
Community Bank & Trust
First National Bank in Wichita
US Bank of
California

Acquirer

Boatmen's First
National Bank

Wesbanco, Inc.
Park National Bank
First Bank National
First National Bank of Hutchinson
Key Bank of Western NY NA
Pioneer Bancorp, Inc.
Durant Bank & Trust Co.
Norwest Bank Nebraska
New Hampshire Savings Bank Corp
Banterra Bank
Marquette Bank Rochester NA

Grand National
Bank
KeybankNA

New Dartmouth
l
Bank
Wells Fargo Bank
Minnesota

Bank of Tazewell County
Boatmen's Bank of
North Iowa
Ameribanc, Inc.
Mellon Bank Corp
United Bank & Trust Co.
Emigrant Savings Bank
Planters National Bank & Trust Co.
Bankwest of Nevada

RBC Centura Bank
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PNC Bank of New England

Hancock Holding Co.
Independent Bank Corp

Security Pacific Bank NV NA
Valley Bank & Trust
First MRCH Bank NA
Harris Bank Hinsdale NA
Border Trust Co.
Jefferson National Bank
Bank of Northumberland
Dubuque Bank & Trust Co.
Riggs National Corp
State National Bank
Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co.

LNB Bancorp,lnc
LSB Bancshares Inc
Lakeland Bancorp Inc
Lenox Bancorp Inc
Lincoln Financial Corp
MNB Bancshares Inc
MassBank Corp
Mercantile Bancorp
NBT Bancorp Inc
NSD Bancorp Inc
National Community Banks
Inc
National Penn Bancshares Inc
North Fork Bancorp Inc
North Side Savings Bank

Bank of America
NA

Rochester Community Savings Bank
Valley American Bank & Trust Co.
Citizens National Bank of Evansville
North Fork Bank

Northern Trust Corp
Old Second Bancorp Inc
Pacific Bank NA
Pacific Capital Bancorp
Patriot National Bank
Peoples Bancorp of Worcester
Inc
Provident Bankshares Corp
Quincy Savings Bank
Second National Financial
Corp
Sierra Tahoe Bancorp
Sierrawest Bank
Silicon Valley Bancshares
SouthTrust Corp
Southside Bancshares Corp
Suffolk Bancorp
Surety Capital Corp
Tolland Bank
Trustcompany Bancorp
US Bancorp
USTCorp
Union Planters Corp
United National Bancorp
Village Bancorp Inc

United Counties Trust Co.
American Express CNTRN Bank
Gold Bank
Cambridge Trust Co.
Citizens Banking Co.
First National Bank of Florida

Meridian Bank,
New Jersey

Bank of A Levy
National Bank of Alaska
First National Bank
Swineford National Bank
Portsmouth Bankshares Inc.
First Financial Bancorp
Bank Leumi Trust Co. of New York
Union Bancshares, Inc.
Central Bank
Chemical Bank Thumb Area
Downington National Bank
Sunwest Bank of Albuquerque NA
State Street Bank and Trust Co.
State Bank of Axtell
First National Bank of Commerce
Bank One WV NA
First National Bank ofBuhl
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Waltham Corp
Washington Trust Bancorp Inc
Wintrust Financial Corp
Zions Bancorp

Bank of Commerce
Rapides Bank & Trust Co. in
Alexandria
Republic Bancorp
The Summit Bancorporation

Summit Bank
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c. Market Statistic
Table 7 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used to measure the samples performance. Return on Equity
(ROE) is defined as Net Income divided by Capital Equity. This variable examined value added by the adoption of
a poison pill plan. Return on Assets (ROA) is defmed as Net Income divided by Total Assets. This variable
examined the effect of the adoption on operating performance. The "Before" and "After" indicators designate the
variables that measured the year before data from the year after adoption data. Also, the sample is divided into two
groups, the Poison Pill Sample and Comparison Group. The Poison Pill Sample is made up of the 70 banks that
adopted a poison pill plan from 1988 to 2004. The Comparison Group is a sample of 70 separate banks that never
adopted a poison pill plan and were matched with the Poison Pill Sample based on Total Assets.

Table 7
Descriptive Statistics

Poison Pill Sample
ROE Before
ROE After
ROABefore
ROAAfter
Comparison Group
ROE Before
ROE After
ROA Before
ROA After

N

Mean

Median Std. Deviation

70
65
70
65

0.1396
0.1076
0.2264
0.0085

0.1210
0.1216
0.0098
0.0095

0.1583
0.1096
1.7494
0.0095

70
61
70
61

0.0999
0.1084
0.0094
0.0091

0.1329
0.1227
0.0106
0.0104

0.2853
0.0932
0.0084
0.0066
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Table 8 provides the descriptive statistics for the control variables used in the correlation analysis, non-parametric
test, and logistic regression. The fIrst variable is Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the year over year change in the
Gross Domestic Product of the United States. The year variable measures the number of adoptions that occurred in
a particular year. Further frequency data for the number and years of the adoptions is provided in Table 9.
Herftndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a measure of market concentration. HHI takes on values between I
(monopoly) and 0 (free market).

Table 8
Control Variables
Min.
Max.
Mean Median Std. Deviation
GDP
1.0817
-0.2
4.5
3.336
3.7
4.9117
Year
1988
2004
1994
1995
HHI
0.00515 0.04904 0.01302 0.0072
0.0124
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Table 9 provides the frequency distribution for the number of poison pill plans adopted in each year covered by this
study. The greatest number of poison pill plans was adopted in 1989, in line with Srinidhi and Sen's (2002)
observation. More than 20% of the banks that adopted poison pill plans did so in 1989. Other major trends include
a resurgence of plan adoptions in the mid-1990s, centering on the implementation of the Riegle Neal Act of 1997.

Table 9
Date of Adoption Frequency Distribution
Frequency
Percentage
1988
3
4.29%
1989
15
21.43%
1990
7
10.00%
5
7.14%
1991
1
1.43%
1992
1
1.43%
1993
1994
1
1.43%
1995
6
8.57%
1996
6
8.57%
1997
4
5.71%
6
8.57%
1998
2
2.86%
1999
1
1.43%
2000
5
7.14%
2001
4
5.71%
2002
1
1.43%
2003
2
2.86%
2004
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D. Figures
Figure 1

I

Poison Pill Adopted vs. GDP Growth Rate
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Figure 2

N umber of Poison Pill Adopted vs. BBI
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